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Credit derivatives:
The latest new thing
In a rapidly expanding derivatives mar-
ket, today’s “latest thing” may soon be
listed at trillions of dollars.1 It is the
prospect of improved methods for
managing an old risk that has piqued
the interest of bankers. Derivatives
dealers are similarly interested in the
prospect of booking derivative con-
tracts for bank loans recently valued
at $2.7 trillion.2 The “old risk” is the
risk of loan default and it is the size
of the loan market that is motivating
dealers to make sizable investments to
develop the technology to manage
this risk.
This Chicago Fed Letter first defines the
category of contracts labeled credit
derivatives, then compares those
contracts with traditional credit-risk
management tools. Lastly, the article
reviews some problems facing this
contract market.
What is a credit derivative?
In short, a credit derivative is a con-
tract that transfers credit risk. We can
define credit risk as any loss that stems
from a change in the ability of a bor-
rower to repay a debt. Clearly, the bor-
rower’s declaration of bankruptcy
constitutes such a change, because
repayment of any outstanding debt
becomes subject to legal proceedings.
While these bankruptcy events have
been frequent in a historical sense,
they tend to be much less frequent
than changes in a firm’s bankruptcy
prospects. Changes in the prospects
for bankruptcy are any changes that
alter the likelihood that a firm will later
become insolvent. Among these would
be a downgrade in a debt-rating agen-
cy’s classification of a company’s debt,
e.g., from “single A” to “triple B;”
the onset of a recession resulting in
increases in personal bankruptcies;
or economic problems affecting the
ability of a nation to repay its debt.
Except for the sovereign debt of the
world’s most-developed countries,
most debt has some degree of credit
risk. Each of these events is an impor-
tant concern for debt holders. Credit
derivatives provide a mechanism for
managing this risk.
Credit derivatives are similar to other
derivatives in that they transfer risk
between firms. The distinction is that
credit derivatives transfer credit risk
rather than price or interest rate risk.
Much like insurance companies, firms
develop specialities in managing cer-
tain types of risk. Credit derivatives
enable firms to carve out the credit
exposures inherent in certain debt
obligations and transfer that risk to
other firms better adapted to manage
that risk. For example, a regional bank
may have credit risks owing to its inabil-
ity to diversify its loan portfolio with
loans made in its geographic region.
From the perspective of this bank, risk
transfers make sense when the cost
of managing an uncompensated risk
exceeds the cost of transferring it. If
the bank taking on the risk can man-
age the risk at a cost lower than the
fee paid by the risk-transferring bank,
the contract is an attractive one. The
economy benefits from the transfer
because it results in a better match
between the risk and the resources
devoted to risk management.
While the purpose of a credit deriva-
tive contract is clear, the precise form
of the contract is more difficult to
explain. In fact, there is no generic
contract form. All contracts conveying
credit risk between counterparties can
be labeled credit derivatives. Unlike
swaps, where nearly all contracts are
variations of the interest rate swap,
credit derivatives are not nearly so
standardized. In a 1996 survey, the
British Banker’s Association identified
the following four distinct categories
of credit derivative contracts: credit
default contracts, total return swaps,
credit spread contracts, and credit
linked notes.3
To get the flavor of these contracts,
consider a credit default swap. In this
contract, the insured makes a period-
ic payment to the insurer. In return,
in the event of a default, the insurer
makes a payment to the insured. Should
no credit event occur, the insured re-
ceives no payment. For example, a bank
having credit exposure from loans the
bank previously made to a firm may
agree to pay the insurer 20 basis points
per quarter. In this instance the credit
event is defined as a rating downgrade
of the firm’s other debt; if such a down-
grade occurs, the bank receives a pre-
arranged cash payment.
Putting this example into perspective,
the bank holding the debt of this firm
has three choices. First, it can continue
to hold the debt. Doing so, it incurs
the costs of capital and loss provisions
needed to support that risk level. Sec-
ond, it can sell the debt, in this case
incurring costs associated with debt
sales. Third, it can insure fully or par-
tially against loss by entering into a
credit derivative contract. Comparing
its alternatives, the bank should adopt
the least costly of the three. In some
instances, the least-cost course will be
the credit derivative. Particularly attrac-
tive is the ability to write the contract
to obtain a good fit with the needs of
the institution. In contrast to the loan-
sale alternative which sells bundles of
risks, the credit derivative enables the
bank to insure specific risk attributes
when the cost of this insurance is low,
while holding capital against those
risks when insurance costs are rela-
tively high. For some institutions, the
preferred approach may be a mix of
credit derivatives with capital holdings
against those risks retained.4An alternative to loan loss provisions
Loan loss provisions are the traditional
means by which banks manage their
credit exposures. However, while loss
reserves serve as a buffer stock for banks,
they carry an opportunity cost. In cer-
tain circumstances, credit derivatives
may be used to mitigate this cost.
Most of the costs referred to in the
description of the loan-sale alternative
above are reasonably predictable. One
cost that is not so predicable is what
economists call an “adverse selection
premium.” Banks that are unable to
credibly reveal their valuations of the
loans they put up for sale will general-
ly find that these loans must be sold
at a discount to the bank’s assessed
valuations. This is because potential
purchasers of the debt will presume
the bank is selling its weakest credits;
that is, it is selling its “lemons.” The
difference between the market price
and the bank’s valuation is the adverse
selection premium, which compensates
the purchaser against the risk that the
bank is selling its weakest loans. Such
revenue shortfalls can impair the
bank’s ability to meet its financial
obligations. To protect against these
circumstances, banks traditionally
have maintained inventories of liquid
assets that can be sold without discount.
Using the proceeds to fund the bank’s
other obligations, the bank maintains
its value as an ongoing institution.
These holdings give the bank time to
shop the loans it sells, thereby reducing
the loss the bank would incur if it were
forced to sell its loans more rapidly.
From this perspective, the bank faces
an inventory problem. It must main-
tain an inventory of liquid assets suffi-
cient to meet its future loan loss
experience. However, investments
made in this inventory generally yield
a lower return than the bank’s other
uses for its funds. Hence, the bank in-
curs an opportunity loss for maintain-
ing an inventory of loan loss reserves.
A credit derivative strategy may be em-
ployed to mitigate this loss.
The credit derivative strategy can be
construed as dynamically provisioning
against loan losses. Contrast this with
the static inventory allocation repre-
sented by loan loss provisions. With
credit derivatives, the bank maintains
an off-balance-sheet position that de-
livers funds as needs arise, rather than
maintaining a funds inventory. The
“just-in-time” arrival of funds via a credit
derivative contract can fulfill the bank’s
needs for immediate funds to meet
financial obligations. Like manufac-
turing firms that adopt just-in-time
inventory systems, this can be a more
cost-efficient solution to funding
bank operations.
Problems facing the market for
credit derivatives
The credit derivative market faces two
challenges that, if overcome, should
result in growth along the lines of that
realized in interest rate contracts. The
first challenge is to find a balance
between standardization and customi-
zation. From a pure risk reduction
perspective, the insurance aspect of
a credit derivative is most effective
when the contract’s cash-flow driver,
that is, the price that determines the
payment made to the insured, is the
value of the debt being insured. This
is often impractical. First, valuations
of many debt contracts are not pub-
licly available. Second and equally
problematic, the insuring institution
will often have an information advan-
tage over the insurer. Thus, a credit
derivative contract written against debt
for which the bank has an information
advantage entails an adverse selection
premium. Unless this premium is less
than that incurred on the sale of the
debt, the credit derivative presents no
advantage over a loan sale.
To avoid these problems, the cash-flow
driver for the credit derivative must be
publicly available and not give the
bank an information advantage. Most
often, this will be a publicly available
price or index correlated with the
bank’s exposure to credit loss. For
example, a bank loan to a developing
country might be insured using the
publicly traded debt of that country.
Often the prospects for both will
change together, though not precisely.
This lack of precise cash-flow matching
reduces the insurance value of the
contract. Thus, credit derivatives are
likely to succeed when contracts can
be written against standard bench-
marks. An example is the Quarterly
Bankruptcy Index (QBI) contract re-
cently proposed by the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange. The QBI is an index
of personal bankruptcy in the U.S.
that has historically been strongly cor-
related with the loss experience of the
largest credit-card issuers. Since the
index includes all U.S. personal bank-
ruptcies, no one institution has a sig-
nificant information advantage, so the
adverse selection premium is likely to
be small.
The second challenge facing the credit
derivative market is a regulatory mat-
ter. Regulatory capital is broken into
tiers. Tier 1 capital consists of proceeds
from the sale of stock and accumulat-
ed retained earnings. Tier 2 capital
includes these items and other mar-
ket issuances, as well as provisions for
loan losses subject to two limitations.
The first limitation is that loan loss
provisions included as capital cannot
exceed 1.25% of gross risk-weighted
assets. The second is that the total
value of these provisions cannot exceed
that of all other forms of tier 2 capital.
With tier 2 capital requirements at 8%
of risk-weighted assets, loan loss provi-
sions are an important component of
regulatory capital. Proponents of the
new risk-adjusted methods of manag-
ing bank capital such as RAROC argue
that, on a correctly risk-adjusted basis,
tier 2 capital levels should be around
5%. This implies that institutions that
currently have excess balances of liquid
assets are bearing a large cost for hold-
ing these balances. Banks can be ex-
pected to seek ways to lower their costs
by pushing for regulations that permit
substitution of credit derivative con-
tracts for loan loss provisioning. Thus
far, the regulatory response in the U.S.
and elsewhere has focused primarily on
the prospect that banks will use credit
derivatives to increase risk rather than
on their risk-reducing potential.
The Bank of England published a pro-
visional letter on credit derivatives in
late 1996. British regulators classify
bank assets as “trading book” or “loan
book.” Capital charges for loan-book
assets are larger, reflecting their lesser
liquidity. The Bank of England judged
the credit derivative market to be in-
sufficiently liquid to permit the more
favorable trading-book classification.
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is that an exchange-traded contract
would add the liquidity needed to
obtain trading-book treatment in the
UK. To the extent that regulatory capi-
tal requirements are binding on these
institutions, this regulatory cost limits
the use of credit derivatives.
In the U.S., the Federal Reserve and
the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) have taken different
paths. The OCC holds that the credit
derivative market is too new to take
broad regulatory measures. The OCC
is concerned that moving too quickly
would adversely affect the innovation
process, and is evaluating institutions’
credit derivative positions on a case-by-
case basis. Since these evaluations in-
volve proprietary information, the
trend in these decisions is not apparent.
In principle, the regulators seem to
be aware of the potential for increas-
ing the efficiency of risk transfers, and
they view their case-by-case approach
as supporting this emerging market
segment.
The Federal Reserve has published two
guidelines on credit derivatives. The
first was a Supervisory and Regulation
(SR) letter released in August 1996.5
This letter primarily covers credit con-
tracts held in the banking book, so it
affects the end users of these contracts.
The letter directs bank examiners to
base capital requirements for a credit
contract on the credit exposure of the
reference asset. Drawing an analogy
between its present treatment of letters
of credit and its intended treatment
of credit derivatives, the Fed aims to
ascertain the credit exposure of the
underlying credit, determine the pro-
portion of that credit exposure present
in the credit contract, and apply the
capital charge for credit exposures to
the product of these. This treatment
does not appear to recognize risk re-
ductions obtained through holding
a diversified portfolio of credits. In
addition, the letter identifies counter-
party default on the credit derivative
as a credit exposure and requires the
bank to hold capital against this. This
requirement primarily affects dealers.
The Fed published its second guide-
line in an SR letter released in June
1997.6 This letter is primarily intend-
ed to provide guidance for examina-
tions of trading accounts. It categoriz-
es trading book contracts as either
open positions, matched positions,
or offsetting positions and identifies
the types of risk for each: counter-
party credit risk, market risk, and
credit risk from the underlying asset
position. Open positions have expo-
sure to all three risk types. Matched
positions only have exposure to
counterparty credit risk, the other
two risk types being offset. Offsetting
positions, e.g., positions whose pay-
outs match in some but not all states,
also have counterparty risk but their
exposure to market and credit risk is
mitigated, not eliminated. Examiners
are directed to classify risks according
to this matrix and apply standard capi-
tal charges. Additionally, if the un-
derlying reference credit is an
investment grade, the equity capital
charge is applied; if the reference
credit is a speculative grade, the
commodity capital charge is applied.
This treatment does appear to per-
mit consideration of diversification.
Except for bank trading books, regu-
lators have placed significant restric-
tions on the use of credit derivatives.
Credit derivatives used to insure assets
held in the banking books, i.e., most
loans, must replicate the loss experi-
ence of the loan to obtain reductions
in regulatory capital requirements.
This restriction implies that banks
incur the full adverse-selection pre-
mium as if the institution had sold
the loan. In addition, the bank can
be required to hold capital against
any counterparty risk encountered
should the bank’s counterparty fail
to perform. Thus, the credit deriva-
tive strategy will generally be domi-
nated by a strategy of selling loans.
Hence, institutions that have previ-
ously maintained inventories of loan
loss provisions will generally find
these preferable to credit derivatives.
Conclusion
This Chicago Fed Letter introduces credit
derivatives as a tool for achieving cost-
effective management of credit risk,
illustrates the point with an important
form of these contracts, the credit de-
fault swap, and compares the risk reduc-
tion capacity of credit derivatives with
the use of loan loss provisioning. Final-
ly, some conditions for the success of




1Growth figures vary considerably, but no one
disputes that the rate of growth is large. For
example, the notional value of interest rate
swaps has grown from about zero in 1984 to
over $40 trillion today.
2Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Bulletin, February 1998.
3British Bankers’ Association, Credit Derivatives
Survey of the London Market, November 1996.
4The bank has a fourth alternative, it can
securitize the loan by offering structured
notes. Structured notes are financially engi-
neered products that shift the loan off the
bank’s books while retaining the credit risk
portion. In some instances, the bank obtains a
reduction in capital requirements. The struc-
ture adds complexity to the cost comparison
used above but, in broad terms, a similar cost
comparison would be made.
5See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, “Supervisory guidance for credit deriv-
atives,” SR letter, No. 96-17, 1996.
6See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, “Application of market risk capital
























































































































































































































































Manufacturing output indexes, 1992=100
CFMMI
IP
1995 1996 1997 1998
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Mar. Month ago Year ago
Cars 5.3 5.4 6.1
5.9 6.3 6.2 Light trucks
Manufacturing output indexes
(1992=100)
Mar. Month ago Year ago
CFMMI 125.6 125.6 121.3
124.9 130.7 130.4 IP
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Apr. Month ago Year ago
MW 64.9 65.3 61.7
56.6 57.6 53.4 U.S.
Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing
Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16 industries,
based on monthly hours worked and kilowatt hours.
IP represents the Federal Reserve Board’s Indus-
trial Production Index for the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Autos and light trucks are measured in an-
nualized units, using seasonal adjustments devel-
oped by the Board. The purchasing managers’
survey data for the Midwest are weighted averages
of the seasonally adjusted production components
from the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee Purchas-
ing Managers’ Association surveys, with assistance
from Bishop Associates, Comerica, and the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing Index (CFMMI) was unchanged in
March from its revised February level of 125.6 (1992=100). The Federal Reserve
Board’s Industrial Production Index (IP) for manufacturing declined from
130.7 in February to 130.4 in March. The Midwest purchasing managers’ com-
posite index for production decreased to 64.9% in April from 65.3% in March.
Purchasing managers’ indexes decreased in Chicago and Detroit, but increased
in Milwaukee. The national purchasing managers’ composite index decreased
from 57.6% in March to 53.4% in April.
Light truck production decreased from 6.3 million units in February to 6.2 mil-
lion units in March and car production decreased from 5.4 million units to
5.3 million units.